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The Michael Jackson of two or three noses ago and the
Michael Jackson of today – multiple personalities or 
conceptual metonymy? 
The paper deals with the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names 
in expressions of the type the X of Y, in which X is a personal name designating 
humans and Y designates a temporal period. Such expressions, used in connection 
with the original bearer of the name, are considered to be instances of partitive re-
strictive modification. Applying the findings of Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Brdar 
and Brdar-Szabó (2007) concerning the figurative meaning of personal names, the 
paper illustrates that the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy is an essential tool in 
explaining how the figurative meaning of personal names arises in expressions of 
this type. As a result of partitive restrictive modification, the original bearer of the 
personal name is figuratively split into distinct individuals due to the ENTITY FOR 
ACTIVE ZONE metonymy. 
Key words: personal names, figurative meaning, partitive restrictive modifica-
tion, the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy 
1. Introduction
Proper names have attracted the attention of linguists and philosophers alike for 
centuries. There are numerous linguistic and philosophical insights into proper 
names, each focusing on different aspects. Some of these theories have had wide 
application and have been of great importance, while others are merely unsuc-
cessful attempts to construct a valid theory of proper nouns. Philosophy of lan-
guage has produced studies on the reference of proper names: some hold that 
28 S a n j a  B e r b e r o v i :T h e  M i c h a e l  J a c k s o n  o f  t w o  o r  t h r e e  n o s e s  a g o
proper names do not have semantic value, while some even go so far as to claim 
that proper names are not part of language (cf. Frege 1952, Searle 1958, Putnam 
1975, Kripke 1972/1980).1 Furthermore, linguistic theories describe, with 
greater or lesser success, the grammatical makeup and behavior of proper nouns 
and touch upon their reference. Recent publications on proper nouns (Anderson 
2007, Lehrer 1999) confirm that proper nouns remain an interesting and peren-
nial topic in linguistic research.  
Unlike the aforementioned philosophical studies, cognitive linguists (cf. 
Cruse 2000, Barcelona 2003, 2004) have arrived at the conclusion that proper 
nouns do have both a meaning and a reference. Furthermore, a number of recent 
studies written within the framework of cognitive linguistics (Barcelona 2003, 
2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007, Brdar 2007) focus on the figurative meaning 
of proper nouns as accompanied by their irregular morpho-syntactic behavior. 
The findings of these papers show that cognitive linguistics, with its theory of 
metaphor and metonymy, is able to shed light on the figurative use of proper 
names, and indeed offers precisely the explanation lacking in classical theories 
of proper names.  
This paper follows in the footsteps of Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Brdar and 
Brdar-Szabó (2007) in exploring proper names. Specifically, it deals with ex-
pressions of the type the X of Y, in which X is a personal name and Y designates
temporal periods. Such expressions are used in connection with the original 
bearer of the name and are regarded as instances of partitve restrictive modifica-
tion. The paper is an extension of the work of Barcelona and Brdar and Brdar-
Szabó in that it considers the conceptual metonymy ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE es-
sential in explaining how the figurative meaning of personal names arises in ex-
pressions of this type.
The first part of the paper presents cases of irregular behavior of personal 
names, providing examples and discussing the consequences of such irregular 
behavior. The second part focuses on the construction of the figurative meaning 
of personal names in expressions of the type the X personal name of Y in which Y
designates a temporal period and the original bearer of the personal name is 
figuratively split into distinct individuals due to the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE
metonymy. Finally, the paper presents general conclusions drawn from the 
analysis and prospects for further research.
1 For a summary of basic ideas behind the direct-reference doctrine and the reference-via-
meaning doctrine cf. Machery et al. (2004). For criticism of the direct-reference doctrine and 
the reference-via-meaning doctrine cf. Lakoff (1987: 162ff), Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 98ff), 
Cruse (2000: 315-318), Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 127-129) 
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2. On irregular morpho-syntactic behavior of personal names
In their chapters devoted to nouns, descriptive grammars (Quirk et al. 1985: 
288-297, Greenbaum and Quirk 1990: 86-88, Biber et al. 1999: 245-247) state 
that the principal difference between common nouns and proper nouns resides in 
the lack of determination, number contrast and modification. Furthermore, 
proper nouns exhibit more restricted morpho-syntactic features than do common 
nouns, due to their unique denotation. In cognitive grammar terms (Langacker 
1991: 59), the difference between common and proper nouns is that the semantic 
functions of proper nouns, i.e. type, instantiation, quantity, and grounding, are 
fused together in a single expression. Langacker (1991: 101f) points out that a 
personal name “incorporates the idealized cognitive model which specifies that 
it is borne by, and suffices to identify, just one individual”.   
 However, descriptive grammars also provide exceptions to the rules men-
tioned above and discuss circumstances under which proper nouns can appear 
with determiners, besides being modified and marked for number. In examples 
(1)-(3), retrieved from Google, personal names exhibit such irregular morpho-
syntactic behavior. In (1) a. and b. personal names appear with indefinite arti-
cles; in (2) a personal name is accompanied by the definite article and plural-
ized; in (3) personal names are nonrestrictively premodified; in (4) a.-c. personal 
names are restrictively postmodified and, in addition, (4) b. and c. can be treated 
as instances of partitive restrictive modification.  
(1)   a. Every time a Maltese is seen on the celebrity arm of an Elizabeth 
Taylor, a Wayne Newton or a Halle Berry, the perception of the Mal-
tese as a pristine white lounge ornament is advanced. 
b. Hezbollah’s defenders continue to paint its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, 
as an Arafat, not a bin Laden.
(2) I guarantee you that the ones with staying power, the Julia Roberts,
the Brad Pitts, they all have talent, in some manner, and then they 
have this other energy. I don’t know what it is, but I ain’t got it. 
(3)  I love the beautiful Angelina Jolie and the handsome Brad Pitt.
(4)   a. “This isn’t just a rare bird, this is the Brad Pitt of birds, one everyone 
wants to see,” Stiteler said. “Then imagine 5,000 or more Brad Pitts in 
one area in one winter. Most of us are happy if we see one or two in a 
year. But to see 10 or 20 or more in one day...you can imagine how 
bird people got a little excited.” 
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b. I’m sure there’s a difference between the Julia Roberts who eats pizza
and the Julia Roberts you read about in the tabloids. Writing about ce-
lebrity is a way of crystallizing those issues. 
c.  America’s early assessment of bin Laden was similarly flawed. In the 
American mind, of course, the bin Laden of April, 1998, was not the
bin Laden of September, 2001. But his intentions were no secret. Two 
months before the Richardson meeting, bin Laden had issued a fatwa, 
a religious ruling, in which he called on Muslims to kill Americans—
civilians and military. 
The irregular morpho-syntactic behavior of proper nouns has important con-
sequences for their grammatical status and semantic value. According to the 
standard grammars mentioned above, a consequence of irregular behavior of 
proper nouns is the reclassification of proper nouns as common nouns. Proper 
nouns exhibiting such unusual behavior no longer have unique denotation. In 
view of cognitive grammar, Langacker (1991: 59f) points out that, in certain 
cases, which are in contradiction with the idealized cognitive model, the ideal-
ized cognitive model is suspended and a proper noun behaves as a common 
noun, permitting determination and modification, and showing number contrast. 
This further implies that the type/instance distinction, which is neutralized with 
proper names, applies when a proper name is treated as a common noun. Lan-
gacker (1991: 59) concludes that a proper name “acts as a common noun gram-
matically because it is so treated semantically, i.e. the grammatical behavior is 
symptomatic of its meaning”.   
Another consequence of such behavior of proper nouns - the consequence that 
this paper focuses on - is that such proper names have figurative meaning. Cog-
nitive linguists (Radden and Kövecses 1999, Barcelona 2003, 2004, Brdar and 
Brdar-Szabó 2007, Brdar 2007) believe that cognitive mechanisms, namely 
metaphor and metonymy, are involved in the construction of the figurative 
meaning of proper nouns. Radden and Kövecses (1999: 35) briefly mention the 
use of a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, namely CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROP-
ERTY, though which a category stands for a stereotypical property of an individ-
ual and the name acquires a figurative meaning. However, such an approach 
may seem oversimplified in comparison to the complementary models proposed 
by Barcelona, and Brdar and Brdar-Szabo. Barcelona (2003, 2004) discusses at 
length the irregular behavior of proper nouns and the construction of the figura-
tive meaning from the stand point of conceptual metonymy and Lakoff’s (1987) 
metonymic models, namely stereotypes and paragons. Barcelona (2004: 364) 
further argues that the use of a proper name as a common noun can be explained 
by three conceptual factors, namely the stereotypical model, “the mental crea-
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tion of a class of individuals characterized by one or more of the relations and 
properties imported from conceptual model (a) [stereotypical model]” and me-
tonymy which links the source domain, the stereotypical model, to the target 
domain, the class of talented individuals, whose member is the bearer of the 
name. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) devote an entire section to this issue and 
regard tiers of metonymic and metaphoric mappings as vital processes in the 
construction of the figurative meaning of proper names. Depending on the type 
of expressions, the meaning is constructed in tiers of metonymic mappings, 
ranging from one to four, which can be followed by an additional tier of meta-
phoric mappings. In addition, Barcelona (2003) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 
(2007) also address the issue of partitive restrictive modification, exemplified in 
(4) b. and c. Their findings have laid the foundations for the present paper.
3. The role of the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy in conceptual 
partition of a unitary entity
Presented in (5) are expressions of the type the X personal name of Y, in which Y des-
ignates temporal periods and the personal name Zinedine Zidane is used figura-
tively in connection with Zinedine Zidane himself. In examples (5) a.-d., it 
seems that the Zidane of 2006, the Zidane of 1998, and the Zidane of 2002 are 
not the same person, but rather distinct individuals. 
(5) a. Persuaded to come out of retirement to help France’s flagging qualifi-
cation, the Zidane of 2006 is the mere ghost of the once great Zizou,
scorer of two goals in the 1998 final.
b. "Zizou" may not be able to last 90 minutes, but he was the catalyst for 
five dangerous moves until he fizzled out after about an hour. Al-
though his legs tired, his body language resembled the Zidane of '98 
and Euro 2000.
c.  He was not the Zidane of 1998, when he used his head so splendidly to 
score twice to lead France to victory in the final against Brazil in Paris. 
Eight years on, too much was asked of Zidane. It was a sad end to ar-
guably the finest career of his era when he head-butted the Italian 
Marco Materazzi in the chest, apparently in pique because the Italian 
had insulted Zidane’s sister.  
d. The Zidane of 2002 is a man sure of both his talent and his lim-
its, knowing how to make the most of his art. He works for the 
32 S a n j a  B e r b e r o v i :T h e  M i c h a e l  J a c k s o n  o f  t w o  o r  t h r e e  n o s e s  a g o
team but, with his 30th birthday approaching on June 23, has 
added that touch of selfishness long lacking in his game. 
The of phrase modification in these expressions can be understood as an in-
stance of partitive restrictive modification. Quirk et al. (1985: 290) point out that 
in partitive restrictive modification “cataphoric the with restrictive modification 
can have the effect of splitting up the unique referent of the proper noun into dif-
ferent parts or aspects”. Based on this definition, Barcelona (2003: 26) explains 
partitive restrictive modification as follows.
In partitive restrictive modification, the referent of the noun phrase headed by the 
name, which is regularly construed as a unitary entity, is figuratively “split up” 
(hence the term ‘partitive’) and re-categorized as a class of entities, and then the 
restrictive modifier narrows down the referential scope of that NP to just one 
member or a subset of the figurative class. 
The effect produced by partitive restrictive modification is to take the unitary 
referent of a personal name, existing in the realm of reality, and figuratively split 
it into distinct individuals. According to Barcelona (2003: 26-29), the creation of 
this counterfactual class of distinct individuals is achieved metonymically, via a 
WHOLE FOR PART conceptual metonymy, namely ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE. Bar-
celona’s approach to conceptual partition is very useful for analyzing the previ-
ous examples.  
Unlike Barcelona (2003), who mentions the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE meton-
ymy only in relation to partitive restrictive modification, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 
(2007) use the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy in all of their examples when 
analyzing the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names. Accord-
ing to Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 132), the construction of the figurative 
meaning of proper names starts with the primary domain, or domain matrix in 
which one’s encyclopedic knowledge of the bearer of the name is organized. 
Therefore, in the examples in (5), the construction of the figurative meaning of 
the personal name Zidane starts with the intersection of two domains, namely 
the Zidane domain and the football domain. The Zidane domain comprises the 
complete encyclopedic knowledge of Zidane one can posses. Since common 
knowledge of the life and career of Zidane mostly, if not solely, encompasses 
knowledge of Zidane as a football player, the Zidane domain must be considered 
in combination with the football domain. The Zidane domain, therefore, inter-
sects with the football domain, which includes one’s encyclopedic knowledge of 
football as a sport. The intersection of these two domains produces ‘Zidane the 
footballer’. The cognitive mechanism involved in the construction of the figura-
tive meaning is a WHOLE-FOR-PART metonymy, namely the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE 
ZONE metonymy in which the personal name Zidane is the vehicle and ‘Zidane 
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the footballer’ is the target. According to Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 135), 
this metonymy is the basis for all other potential tiers of metonymic and meta-
phoric mappings. 
However, in the construction of the figurative meaning of the proper names in 
(5), the active zone is not the whole intersection of the Zidane domain and the 
football domain. Rather, the active zones are only certain aspects of ‘Zidane the 
footballer’ which are connected to particular periods of Zidane’s career. As 
Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 140) claim, “… time is not a distinct domain in 
such cases but a dimension inherent” in the Zidane domain. The of phrase desig-
nating time indicates that the conceptual partition of a holistic entity, i.e. Zidane, 
is achieved by metonymically focusing on different aspects along the time axis, 
“which can be projected beyond the present time as well, i.e. into the as yet vir-
tual section of the future” (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007: 140).2
The diagram below presents the conceptual partition of a unitary entity along 
the time axis. As the diagram shows, the intersection of the Zidane domain and 
the football domain produces ‘Zidane the footballer’. On the time axis cutting 
across the two domains, the periods of time which are perceived as important 
points in Zidane’s career are isolated. As the diagram further illustrates, the time 
axis stretches from the beginning of Zidane’s life and into the future. The active 
zone is a period in Zidane’s career characterized by an outstanding performance 
in the 1998 World Cup, often regarded as the highlight of his career. The vehicle 
of the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy is the personal name Zidane, while 
the target is the Zidane of 1998. The arrow indicating metonymic mappings is 
placed in the opposite direction, pointing from the target to the vehicle, as in 
models by Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007). The di-
rection of the arrow indicates that the active zone becomes “so prominent as to 
overwrite the whole structure of the original knowledge base (be it a domain or 
matrix).” (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007: 132)
2 Note that Barcelona (2003: 26-29), in the analysis of his examples, regards the domain of 
AGE as a subdomain of the domain of the bearer of the personal name. Furthermore, Barce-
lona (2003: 27) states that “[a]n inherent component of the domain of AGE is a measurement 
scale with several discrete points (the various age phases in life).” 
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Figure 1. Conceptual partition of a unitary entity ‘Zidane’ along the time axis. 
In the examples above the Zidane of 1998, the Zidane of 2002, and the Zidane 
of 2006 are treated as members of a counterfactual group of distinct individuals 
due to a conceptual partition via the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy. As-
suming that a person changes in certain respects and to some extent as time 
passes, the temporal periods mentioned in the of phrase represent different 
stages in the life of a person, in this case Zidane. For each temporal period 
marked in Zidane’s life, certain characteristic properties of the Zidane of that pe-
riod can be isolated. Conceptual partition along the time axis isolates periods in 
Zidane’s life during which his characteristic properties were distinct enough to 
be considered as belonging to different individuals. The conceptual partition of 
this sort can be only achieved by comparing and contrasting different properties 
viewed at different stages of the individual’s life. The diagram below shows dif-
ferent stages in Zidane’s football career and the defining properties of each tem-
poral period.
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Figure 2. A fragment of the figurative counterfactual class of ZIDANES along the time axis. 
In example (5) a., Zidane’s performance in the 2006 World Cup is considered 
not nearly as good as his performance during the 1998 World Cup. As this ex-
ample illustrates, the of phrase postmodification is not the only means of achiev-
ing conceptual partition. In this example, the expression the once great Zizou,
scorer of two goals in the 1998 final is an instance of conceptual partition by re-
strictive premodification. However, it must be noted that another expression 
helps in conceptual partition, i.e. the noun phrase in apposition, scorer of two 
goals in the 1998 final, itself containing restrictive postmodification. In example 
(5) b. the Zidane of the present is compared with the Zidane of ‘98 and Euro 
2000, when his football career was at its peak. It is interesting that the of phrase
in the expression the Zidane of ‘98 and Euro 2000 contains two noun phrases, 
one referring to a temporal period, 1998, and the other to a tournament, Euro 
2000. It can be assumed that the event, Euro 2000, metonymically stands for the 
time period, 2000, via the EVENT FOR TIME metonymy.3
3 This metonymy is not unusual. Events can stand for temporal periods, just as temporal 
periods can stand for events. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 154) illustrate this metonymy with 
the sentence The Kronos Quartet Concert is approaching. In this sentence, the event of the 
concert stands for the time of the concert. Similarly, in expressions such as during World War 
II or during the Vietnam war, the events, World War II and the Vietnam War metonymically 
stand for the temporal periods, 1939-1945 and 1959-1975, respectively. Furthermore, in 
today's omnipresent expression, September 11, time metonymically stands for an event, the 
attacks on the World Trade Center, via the EVENT FOR TIME metonymy.    
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 In (6) a.-c., Saddam Hussein is the personal name used in expressions of the 
type the X personal name of Y.
(6)  a.  The Saddam of 1968-80, or as some called him back then “the Ataturk 
of modern Iraq”, was certainly better than the ruthless dictator who 
emerged after the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. That Saddam, after all, 
was a ruthless leader.  
 b. The Saddam of December 30, 2006 was different from the one of Sep-
tember 22, 1980, who invaded Iran. This Saddam was different from 
the one who eliminated the Kurds, a common problem for Iran, Iraq 
and Turkey, in 1987-88, and the Saddam who recited kalma-e-
shahadat at the scaffold was absolutely different from the secular 
Saddam of the Baath Party.
 c.  One of the callers drew a parallel between the Saddam Hussein of to-
day and the Hitler of the 1930’s and contended appeasement is no way 
to approach the former in light of what occurred with the latter. (from 
an article published in October 2002) 
In (6) a., the of phrase designates a long temporal period which stretches from 
the beginning of Saddam’s presidency to the Iran-Iraq War.4 This expression, 
together with the expression the Saddam of 1968-80, emphasizes the positive 
aspects of Saddam Hussein, who, as the context reveals, became a ruthless dicta-
tor in later years. Unlike this example, the temporal period designated by the of
phrase in (6) b. is a single day, the day of Saddam Hussein’s death. Additionally, 
this Saddam is compared with the Saddams referred to by different noun 
phrases, which are highlighted in the context. The conceptual partition in each of 
these expressions is achieved by restrictive modification of different types. Such 
expressions in this context further emphasize the distinctions among the mem-
bers of a counterfactual class of Saddams. In example (6) c., there are two ex-
pressions of the type the X personal name of Y, i.e. the Saddam Hussein of today and 
the Hitler of the 1930’s. In both expressions, the conceptual partition is achieved 
by the of phrases which designate temporal periods. In addition, the Saddam of 
4 Another expression which contains a figuratively used personal name, the Ataturk of modern 
Iraq, appears in (6) a. The figurative meaning of the personal name in this expression arises in 
multiple tiers of metonymic and metaphoric mappings. Cf. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) for 
the construction of metaphtonymic meaning in multiple tiers of metonymic and metaphoric 
mappings and Berberovi  (2007) for the types of source and target domains involved in the 
tier of metaphoric mappings. 
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the period before the Iraq War is compared with the Hitler of the period before 
World War II.
 As the examples in (6) show, the temporal periods designated by the of phrase
can range from decades or years to mere days or hours. However, provided that 
the speaker can isolate features of an individual perceived as sufficiently distinct 
and connected to a certain life period, whether long or short, the conceptual par-
tition of a unitary entity can occur. Such characteristics may be observed by a 
majority of speakers, but may also be based on the personal opinion and judg-
ment of a single speaker, as illustrated by the following examples.    
As in the Zidane examples in (5), conceptual partition enables the creation of 
a counterfactual class of distinct individuals along the time axis. However, as the 
examples in (7) show, the temporal periods isolated and ultimately the character-
istics focused upon greatly depend on the speaker’s judgment and point of view. 
Whether the Zidane of 1998 and the Zidane of 2006 are perceived as distinct in-
dividuals depends not only on encyclopedic knowledge but also on personal 
judgment. This is even more conspicuous in the following examples concerning 
George Bush.
(7)  a. But the George Bush of 2006 seems to be a far cry from the man I 
spoke with in 2001, or the back-slapping governor who charmed the 
hell out of me when I visited him in the Texas governor’s mansion in 
1999.
b.  Well-known East Bay poet Ishmael Reed recited one of his poems and 
rejected claims that Bush has been transformed by the Sept. 11 attacks. 
“The George Bush of today is the same George Bush of September 
10,” he said. 
 c.  His most interesting observation, I thought, was about the vast differ-
ence between the George Bush of today and the George Bush of 1994,
when he was debating Ann Richards during the Texas gubernatorial 
race: This Bush was eloquent. He spoke quickly and easily. [....] Obvi-
ously, Bush doesn’t sound this way as President, and there is no one 
conclusive explanation for the change. 
In example (7) a., apart from the of phrase, the conceptual partition of a uni-
tary entity is achieved by another type of restrictive posmodification, namely a 
relative clause. In this example, the speaker perceives the George Bush of 2006
as a completely different individual in comparison to the George Bush of 2001
or the George Bush of 1999. This comparison is based on the speaker’s encoun-
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ters with George Bush in 1999 and 2001. It is obvious that the speaker perceives 
certain properties, actions, decisions, and behavior characterizing George Bush 
in one temporal period as being distinct enough from those characterizing him in 
a different temporal period. This does not mean, however, that such differences 
will be perceived by all speakers. This is further confirmed by example (7) b. As 
it can be inferred from the context, it is believed that the September 11 attacks 
had a great impact on George Bush’s political career, and that he is no longer the 
person he was before the attacks. However, this difference is not acknowledged 
by the speaker who equates the George Bush of today with the George Bush of 
September 10.  In (7) c., the speaker distinguishes the George Bush of 1994 from 
the George Bush of today on the basis of eloquence, contending that his speak-
ing abilities in the two periods are not the same.  
Noticeably, the interpretation and use of expressions with partitive restrictive 
modification depend not only on the knowledge but also on the opinion of the 
speaker. In the Zidane examples in (5), the characteristics are to some extent ob-
jective, being perceived in the same fashion by the majority of the speakers - 
more precisely, by football fans. However, in examples in (7), the characteristic 
properties isolated are less objective, being based on the opinions of the speak-
ers and formed under specific circumstances, or focusing on different qualities. 
It seems that as long as the speaker perceives certain characteristic properties as 
outstanding and defining, regardless of the standards employed, the conceptual 
partition can be achieved. Furthermore, the context in which expressions of the 
type the X of Y in examples presented above appear seems very important. Clues 
in the context point to the properties which the speaker has isolated as defining 
and distinctive.  
 Besides qualities and performance, the speaker can also perceive the physical 
appearance of a person in one life period as distinct from that of another period, 
thereby allowing for partitive restrictive modification. The examples in (8) show 
that speakers perceive the Michael Jackson of today and the Michael Jackson of 
the 80s as two distinct individuals, based on his physical appearance before and 
after undergoing numerous plastic surgeries. In all of these examples, the defin-
ing properties isolated for the two temporal periods are those pertaining to 
physical appearance. Furthermore, the humorous expression in the title, the Mi-
chael Jackson of two or three noses ago, further supports this claim, but also 
shows that, unlike the common expressions relating to Zidane in (5), expressions 
with partitive restrictive modification can be created by the speaker on the spur 
of the moment as nonce construction. 
(8) a. And the Michael Jackson of today, the physically transformed, faded 
King of Pop, who will enter the cramped, nondescript courtroom in a 
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California farm town Monday morning to face charges of child moles-
tation.
b. Is it just me, or does the zombie version of Michael Jackson in 
“Thriller” from 1983 look a lot healthier than the Michael Jackson of 
today?
c. The Michael Jackson of the 1980s is gone, forever replaced by the vi-
sion of a man who has had too much plastic surgery and is afraid of 
the outside world. 
d. I miss the Michael Jackson of the 80's... Thriller, one glove, jackets 
with zippers, still had most of his nose. 
However, the expressions the Michael Jackson of the 80s and the Michael 
Jackson of today can be used not only for the physical appearance of the person 
in question but also his musical career, as in (9). In the 1980’s, Michael Jack-
son’s career reached its peak; he enjoyed world-wide fame for his dazzling per-
formances and number-one hits. Nowadays he is better known for his controver-
sial personal life and child molestation trials than for his music or performances. 
These expressions show that the use of the expressions in question relies on the 
speaker’s judgment or what, in speaker’s opinion, presents a defining moment in 
the individual’s career. As in (8), the presence of contextual clues reveals which 
characteristic properties are highlighted. However, this also points out the fact 
that the contextual clues are crucial in these examples. Otherwise, the interpreta-
tion of the expressions would depend on the hearer’s knowledge and personal 
opinion, which could of course yield a meaning contrary to the speaker’s inten-
tions.
(9)  a. And the Michael Jackson of today is not the Michael Jackson who at 
one time was the No. 1 pop star in the world. His “Thriller” CD topped 
the charts, while his latest didn’t crack the top 10. (2003 interview) 
b. What happened to the Michael Jackson of the 80s? The King of Pop. 
Badass-extraordinaire, whose spicy moves and delicate voice buckled 
knees of desiring women across the world. According to reviews of his 
appearance at the World Music Awards in London, Jackson managed 
only to struggle through a few lines of his performance before being 
booed off stage by a disappointed audience.  
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 c. But the Michael Jackson of the 1980’s died. The man who was ac-
cused of child molestation is not the music legend of my youth. They 
aren’t the same person. 
Example (10) a. is another conceptual partition along the time axis. In this ex-
ample, the Shakira who released the album “Laundry Service” in 2002 and the 
Shakira who released the album “Oral Fixation” in 2005 are perceived as two 
different individuals. In example (10) b., that of Laundry Service is used instead 
of the expression in (10) a., the Shakira of 2001, which refers to the same indi-
vidual in the counterfactual class of individuals created by conceptual partition. 
This example, in some respects, resembles example (10) b., in which an event 
stands for the temporal period. However, in this example, it seems that there are 
two metonymies at work. Via the first metonymy, the result of the event, i.e. the 
album, stands for the event of writing or releasing the album. Via the second 
metonymy, the album stands for the period of time when the album was written 
or released.        
(10) a. The album leaves a little bit of sadness, though, for people who 
long for the Shakira of 2001. That Shakira is no more, and in or-
der to fully appreciate Oral Fixation Vol. 2 music lovers need to 
take more than just a first listen.  
b.  Then we have Animal city and Timor throwing in some serious 
pep and grind. Don’t expect a Whenever wherever rerun on 
these two records, for the lady has grown to learn that to get oral 
and then have them all fixated, you’ve got to shed your inhibi-
tions and do something different. And that’s just the difference 
between the Shakira of now and that of Laundry Service. (from
an article published in February 2006) 
In order to show that (10) b. is not an exception, similar examples are presented 
in (11) and (12). These examples can be analyzed in the same way as (10) b. In 
(11), via the same two metonymies as in (10) b., the album “The Eminem 
Show” stands for 2002 and the album “the Slim Shady” stands for 1999. The 
same analysis can be applied to the examples in (12). In these examples, by con-
ceptual partition, the Shakespeare who wrote sonnets and the Shakespeare who 
wrote plays are perceived as two different individuals.   
(11) The Eminem of “The Eminem Show” is as just as sour as the Eminem 
of "The Slim Shady LP," but where he once trucked almost solely in 
lacerating self-deprecation, he now adds way too much overwrought 
self-aggrandizement to the mix: every slur he tosses off is a valiant 
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slur in the name of free speech, and all the silly finger-waggers who 
chastise him are granted powers they don’t 
(12) a. The Shakespeare of the sonnets is a very different person from the 
playwright who gave us King Lear, The Tempest and A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream. In the plays he is the consummate craftsman, enter-
taining audiences with masterpieces of dramatic effect while exploring 
human character to a degree seen never before or since. The sonnets, 
though, reveal a more thoughtful, introspective writer, a philosopher-
poet inquiring, especially, into the question of Time and its effect on 
human affairs. 
 b. We presume the Shakespeare of the Sonnets possibly completed all 
154 by the end of the 1590s, but they would have been passed around, 
in Manuscript form, for years before. 
Examples in (10) b., (11), and (12) show that the conceptual partition of a uni-
tary entity along the time axis can be more complex, employing more than one 
conceptual metonymy. Nevertheless, the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy 
plays a leading role in these examples as well.   
4. Conclusion
The paper attempts to demonstrate the construction of the figurative meaning of 
personal names in expressions of the type the X personal name of Y, in which Y des-
ignates temporal periods. The of phrase modification in such expressions can be 
regarded as an instance of partitive restrictive modification. The effect of this 
modification is the conceptual partition of a unitary entity along the time axis. In 
simpler terms, an individual, the bearer of the personal name, is figuratively “cut 
into pieces”, “each piece” representing a different individual. The leading role in 
conceptual partition is played by the ENTITY FOR ACTIVE ZONE metonymy, in 
which the target is a temporal period and the vehicle is a personal name. This 
metonymy enables a unitary entity, i.e. an individual, to be perceived as a class 
of individuals. 
 The temporal periods designated by the of phrase can be quite long or rela-
tively short. However, the only condition which must be met is that the person’s 
characteristics are perceived as sufficiently distinct at one point in time to be 
considered as belonging to a different individual. This holds true if one grants 
that a person changes physically, mentally, or emotionally, as time passes. How-
ever, these changes may not be perceived in the same fashion by all, nor may 
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they be apparent or accessible to every speaker. Therefore, the use of the expres-
sions in question, to a large extent, depends on the encyclopedic knowledge of 
the speaker but also his personal opinions and judgment. This being the case, the 
context, in most cases, provides clues as to which characteristic properties are 
isolated as distinct and defining in the temporal period in question. Otherwise, 
without contextual clues, the interpretation may depend on the hearer’s encyclo-
pedic knowledge and opinions.      
For further research, it would be interesting to consider partitive restrictive 
modification of personal names by means of postmodifiers other than the of
phrase. At first blush, it seems that the construction of the figurative meaning in 
such expressions would be far more complex and not based on a single meton-
ymy only. However, as luck would have it, cognitive linguistics is well equipped 
to explain the construction of the figurative meaning of personal names in such 
expressions.
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THE MICHAEL JACKSON OF TWO OR THREE NOSES AGO I 
THE MICHAEL JACKSON OF TODAY –
VIŠESTRUKA LI NOST ILI KONCEPTUALNA METONIMIJA?
Rad se bavi stvaranjem figurativnog zna enja vlastitih imena u izrazima tipa determinator X 
of Y, u kojima je X vlastito ime, a Y ozna ava vremenski period. Smatra se da su takvi izrazi, 
koji ozna avaju izvornog nositelja imena, primjeri partitivne restriktivne modifikacije. 
Primijenjuju i dostignu a Barcelone (2003, 2004) i Brdara and Brdar-Szabó (2007) u analizi 
figurativnog zna enja vlastitih imenica, rad pokazuje da je konceptualna metonimija ENTITET 
UMJESTO AKTIVNE ZONE neophodna da bi se objasnilo nastajanje figurativnog zna enja 
vlastitih imena u ovim izrazima. Kao rezultat partitivne restriktivne modifikacije, izvorni 
nositelj vlastitog imena je figurativno razdijeljen u razli ite osobe pomo u konceptualne 
metonimije ENTITET UMJESTO AKTIVNE ZONE.
Klju ne rije i: vlastita imena, figurativno zna enje, partitivna restriktivna modifikacija, 
konceptualna metonimija tipa ENTITET UMJESTO AKTIVNE ZONE.
